Genes and Spleens: Property, Contract, or Privacy Rights in the Human Body? by Rao, Radhika
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
2007
Genes and Spleens: Property, Contract, or Privacy
Rights in the Human Body?
Radhika Rao
UC Hastings College of the Law, raor@uchastings.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation





















The legal status of the human body is hotly contested,
yet the law of the body remains in a state of confu-
sion and chaos. Sometimes the body is treated as an
object of property, sometimes it is dealt with under the
rubric of contract, and sometimes it is not conceived
as property at all, but rather as the subject of privacy
rights.1 Which body of law should become the law of
the body? This question is even more pressing in the
context of current biomedical research, which permits
commodification and commercialization of the body
by everyone except the person who provides the "raw
materials."2 The lack of property protection for tangi-
ble parts of the human body is in stark contrast to the
extensive protection granted to intellectual property
in the body in the form of patents upon human genes
and cell lines. Moreover, even courts that reject own-
ership claims on the part of those who supply body
parts appear willing to grant property rights to scien-
tists, universities, and others who use those body parts
to conduct research and create products.
Why is the law willing to confer property rights
upon some while denying the same rights to others?
At first glance, the lopsided treatment of the human
body seems to stem from the distinction between
physical body parts and intellectual property in the
body. Specifically, body parts are seen as a form of raw
material to be harvested, whereas human genes and
cell lines are conceptualized as a kind of man-made
technology. Hence the "inventor" or "discoverer" of
intellectual property in the body is granted broad pro-
tection that extends across space and time, whereas
bodily property is conceived as a tangible thing that
is protected only insofar as it remains in the posses-
sion of its "owner," or that may be deemed un-ownable
and thus not protected at all. But even physical body
parts may receive property protection when they are
in the possession of a scientist rather than an ordinary
person, which suggests that the divergence lies deeper
than a distinction between tangible body parts and
intellectual property in the body.
I believe that these contradictions in the legal treat-
ment of the human body flow from several important
but unstated assumptions about the concept of prop-
erty itself. First, property implicitly privileges some
notions of value over others. Utilitarian and commer-
cial values appear to predominate over other values,
which are often ignored or not capable of being fully
articulated in the language of property law. Second,
property law appears to be weighted in favor of some
kinds of regimes over others: private property appears
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to hold sway over communal property and the public
domain. Finally, a fundamental disagreement exists
over the ultimate goal of property - whether it is con-
trol over the property or the right to receive compen-
sation. Ironically, this may force individuals who resist
commodification and commercialization of their bod-
ies to adopt a legal framework that appears at odds
with their own arguments in order to articulate their
injury and render it legally cognizable. Of course, none
of these assumptions necessarily follows from the
right to property. To the contrary, all of them manifest
a clash between dramatically different understandings
of the concept of property.
When those who supply body parts for medical
research fail to receive shelter under the law of prop-
erty, they often attempt to obtain ownership over their
own bodies by means of contract or invoke the elusive
right to privacy. But neither contract nor privacy is an
adequate substitute for the bundle of rights bestowed
by property. Unlike property, contract law binds only
those who are parties to the agreement, not the whole
world. Furthermore, contracts cannot protect those
who lack the knowledge or power to negotiate effec-
tively. And unlike property, privacy provides only the
right to consent or refuse to permit use of one's body
parts for research, not the right to control the course
of the research or share in the profits. In addition,
privacy implicitly calls for situations of intimacy and
relationships that may not exist between researchers
and those who participate in medical research.
II. Three Paradigms for Legal Regulation
of the Human Body
A. The Body as Property
There are three important cases in which individu-
als have claimed ownership of their own bodies in the
context of biomedical research. In all three cases, the
courts refused to accord property rights to those who
supply body parts for medical research, although the
same courts were willing to recognize the property
rights of other persons in the body parts themselves
and in the resulting products. Almost every student
of property law is familiar with the first case, Moore v.
Regents of the University of California,3 in which the
California Supreme Court ruled that Moore's spleen
was not his property. At the same time, the court
found that the Mo cell line - which had been created
from Moore's spleen cells and, ironically, named after
him - was the property of the researchers who had
been granted a patent upon it. Although the court
permitted Moore's claims for breach of fiduciary duty
and lack of informed consent, it rejected his claim for
conversion and a right to share in the profits resulting
from the Mo cell line because his spleen was not his
property.4 Despite its apparent rejection of the prop-
erty label, however, Moore advanced no alternative
paradigm. The case does not stand for the proposition
that body parts can never become property, for surely
theft of Moore's spleen cells from the scientists' labo-
ratory would have been actionable, 5 as one dissent-
ing justice pointed out.6 Instead, it simply held that
Moore's spleen was not his property.
But few may be familiar with two more recent cases,
Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital7 and Wash-
ington University v. Catalona. Greenberg goes one
step further than Moore by holding not only that the
blood, tissue, and other body parts that the Green-
bergs supplied were not their property, but also that
the gene responsible for their disease was the prop-
erty of the scientists who isolated it and the hospital
that patented it rather than the persons in whose bod-
ies it remained. Several significant differences exist
between Moore and Greenberg. First, the researchers
who owned the patent on the Canavan gene did not
create the gene but merely "discovered" it, unlike those
who made the Mo cell line. Second, unlike Moore, the
Greenbergs actively participated in the quest to locate
the gene for Canavan's disease by contributing their
biological samples. Finally, unlike Moore, the Green-
bergs sought to make the results of this research freely
available to all rather than to share in the profits pro-
duced by the patent. Nevertheless, the court mechani-
cally applied Moore to reject their claims.
And Washington University v. Catalona goes far
beyond both Moore and Greenberg by making explicit
what was only implicit in those cases. In Catalona, the
court concluded that not just intellectual property in
the body but also tangible physical parts of the body
(e.g., blood, DNA, and tissue samples) were owned
by the university that stored them in its Bioreposi-
tory rather than the patients from whose bodies these
biological materials had been derived. Both cases are
notable not just for their conclusions but also for their
language and reasoning; thus, they are described in
greater detail below.
1. GREENBERG V. MIAMI CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL
Canavan disease is a rare genetic disease most preva-
lent among Ashkenazi Jews that is both incurable and
fatal.9 In 1987, after Daniel and Debbie Greenberg
had given birth to two children diagnosed with Cana-
van disease, they sought out a researcher, Dr. Reuben
Matalon, to study the disease.1° Over the years, the
Greenbergs supplied Matalon with blood, urine, and
tissue samples, and when their two children died, they
even donated pieces of their brain to the research.,
The Greenbergs located over 100 other Canavan fami-
lies around the world and convinced them to provide
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blood, urine, and tissue samples too; together they
created a Canavan registry - a confidential database
compiling epidemiological, medical, and other per-
sonal information about the Canavan families.12 The
Greenbergs also provided financial support for the
research, including a grant of about $100,000 in seed
money. 3 As Daniel Greenberg commented, "All the
time we viewed it as a partnership. Our model was the
testing program for Tay-Sachs disease. That's what we
hoped would happen again.'
14
In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that they
provided Matalon with all this bodily property, per-
sonal information, and financial support "with the
understanding and expectation that the samples and
information would be used for the specific purpose of
mutations."21 The plaintiffs alleged that they were
unaware of MCH's intent to commercialize the results
of this research, and that if they had known this fact,
they would not have contributed to the project.2 2 In
their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defen-
dants did not present them with a written consent
form until 1994.23 They argued that this form was
inadequate because it failed to disclose the research-
ers' commercial interests, describing the defendants'
purpose only as "identifying mutations in the Canavan
gene which could lead to carrier detection within their
families and benefit the population at large."24 One of
the parents Judith Tsipis stated, "We gave our samples
to be used for the public good. They were not given
to Miami Children's. Had they told us they wanted
The court further ruled that, even if a medical researcher does have some
duty to gain informed consent, this duty does not require disclosure
of the researcher's economic interests because of the practical
implications of retroactively imposing such a duty.
researching Canavan disease and identifying muta-
tions which could lead to carrier detection within their
families and benefit the population at large."'15 They
also alleged that it was their "understanding that any
carrier and prenatal testing developed in connection
with the research for which they were providing essen-
tial support would be provided on an affordable and
accessible basis, and that Matalon's research would
remain in the public domain to promote the discov-
ery of more effective prevention techniques and treat-
ments and, eventually, to effectuate a cure for Canavan
disease."16
In 1993, Dr. Matalon succeeded in isolating the
gene responsible for Canavan disease, and in 1994, a
patent application was filed.17 In 1997, the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office issued Patent #5,679,635 to the
Miami Children's Hospital (MCH), listing Matalon as
the inventor.'8 As a result of this patent, MCH gained
the ability to restrict any activity related to the Cana-
van disease gene, including carrier and prenatal test-
ing, gene therapy, and other treatments for Canavan
disease involving the gene and its mutations. 9
The plaintiffs alleged that they did not learn of the
existence of the patent until November 1998, when
MCH revealed its intention to limit Canavan disease
testing through a campaign of restrictive licensing
of the patent.2 0 MCH sent out letters to laboratories
that offered Canavan testing, threatening "to enforce
vigorously their intellectual property rights relating
to carrier and patient DNA tests for Canavan disease
to patent it, we probably would have found another
researcher who has the same goals as we did. Finding
the gene is not an impossible task."
25
According to one scholar, MCH had a two-stage
licensing plan to market the Canavan gene patent.
2 6
In the first stage, a limited number of academic labs
would be granted nonexclusive licenses to perform a
limited number of tests at a fixed price of $12.50 per
test.27 In the second stage, MCH would license a large
commercial lab as a market leader with an exclusive
license to the remainder of the testing volume, allow-
ing the lab to engage in monopolistic pricing.
2 8
The plaintiffs filed suit against defendants Dr.
Matalon and Miami Children's Hospital, asserting
six causes of action: (1) lack of informed consent, (2)
breach of fiduciary duty, (3) fraudulent concealment,
(4) conversion, (5) misappropriation of trade secrets,
and (6) unjust enrichment. 29 Plaintiffs sought a per-
manent injunction to prevent defendants from enforc-
ing their patent rights, as well as damages, including
all royalties defendants received on the patent and the
return of financial contributions made by plaintiffs
to support the research.30 The district court granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss all of the plaintiffs'
claims except the claim for unjust enrichment31
The Greenberg court rejected the plaintiffs' claim for
lack of informed consent, distinguishing Moore on the
grounds that Dr. Matalon was acting as a researcher,
rather than a physician; thus, he had no legal duty to
the plaintiffs who were not his patients. The court fur-
GENETICS AND GROUP RIGHTS * FALL 2007
HeinOnline  -- 35 J.L. Med. & Ethics 373 2007
SYMPOSIUM
ther ruled that, even if a medical researcher does have
some duty to gain informed consent, this duty does
not require disclosure of the researcher's economic
interests because of the practical implications of ret-
roactively imposing such a duty.32 Specifically, the
court thought such a duty "would be unworkable and
would chill medical research,' and that it "would give
rise to a type of dead-hand control that research sub-
jects could hold because they would be able to dictate
how medical research progresses."3 3 The court dis-
missed the plaintiffs' claim for breach of fiduciary duty
based upon similar reasoning, finding that "there is no
automatic fiduciary relationship that attaches when a
researcher accepts medical donations ."
34
Yet the Greenberg court relied upon Moore to reject
the plaintiffs' claim for conversion, holding that the
plaintiffs' body tissue and genetic information "were
donations to research without any contemporaneous
expectations of return and thus conversion does not lie
as a cause of action."3 5 According to the court, property
rights in the body are limited and "the property right in
blood and tissue samples evaporates once the sample
is voluntarily given to a third party."36 The court also
repudiated the plaintiffs' argument that the genetic
information contained within their bodies constituted
a separate property interest distinct from the tissue
itself 37 The court conceded that "where information is
gathered and arranged at some cost and sold as a com-
modity on the market, it is properly protected as prop-
erty," but reasoned that this argument provides more
support for property rights in the defendants'research
rather than the donations of the plaintiffs'DNA.3
The one claim that the Greenberg court allowed
to go forward - unjust enrichment - never went to
trial because the parties ultimately reached a settle-
ment agreement. The plaintiffs consented to aban-
don their legal challenge to MCH's ownership and
licensing of the Canavan gene patent, for which MCH
would continue to collect royalties for clinical testing,
in exchange for MCH's promise to permit free use of
the gene in research to cure Canavan disease, includ-
ing gene therapy research and genetic testing in pure
research.39
2. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY V. CATALONA
In Washington University v. Catalona,40 the plaintiff
Washington University (WU) filed a declaratory judg-
ment action seeking to establish ownership of bio-
logical specimens of blood, DNA, and prostate tissue
that were contributed by patients and housed in the
Genito-Urinary (GU) Repository for the purpose of
prostate cancer research.4 1 The defendants were the
patients themselves, who were labeled "research par-
ticipants" by the district court,42 and they believed that
they retained ownership of the biological specimens
they had contributed to the GU Repository.43 More-
over, the defendants had all signed informed consent
forms which typically stated that they were making "a
free and generous gift of your [blood, tissue and/or
DNA] to research that may benefit others" but also
provided that "your participation is voluntary and you
may choose not to participate in this research study
or withdraw your consent at any time."4 4 Based upon
these forms, defendants claimed the right to with-
draw their biological materials from WU and transfer
them to Dr. Catalona at his new post at Northwestern
University.
45
The district court refused to recognize any prop-
erty rights in the patients who supplied the biological
materials stored in the GU Repository.46 Instead, the
court ruled that "plaintiff Washington University owns
all biological materials, including but not limited to
blood, tissue, and DNA samples, in the GU Reposi-
tory." 47 The court reached this result based upon the
circular reasoning that WU was currently in posses-
sion of the biological materials and had continually
asserted its ownership interests in the materials.48 To
buttress this conclusion, the court quoted a number
of WU documents, including an Intellectual Property
Policy, which asserted that "all intellectual property
(including tangible research property) shall be owned
by the university if significant university resources
were used or if it is created pursuant to a research proj-
ect funded through corporate, federal, or other exter-
nal sponsors administered by the University," as well
as Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs), which also
affirmed WU's ownership of biological materials. 49 In
addition, the court concluded that the defendants were
"donors" who had made inter vivos gifts of their bio-
logical materials to WU, even though the defendants
themselves argued that they had always intended to
retain ownership rights.50 The court reached this con-
clusion by focusing upon the language in the informed
consent forms, stating that patients were making a
"gift" of their biological materials for research, as well
as the surrounding circumstances.51 In so doing, the
court failed to give effect to the limiting language in
the same forms that guaranteed those who donated
biological materials the right to withdraw from such
research at any time.52 The court interpreted this lan-
guage exceedingly narrowly, concluding that it gave
patients only the right not to donate additional biolog-
ical materials, and not the right to withdraw samples
already stored in the biorepository.
53
B. The Body Under Contract
When courts have refused to protect body parts as
property, some individuals have turned to the law of
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contract in an attempt to assert control over the use
and transfer of their own bodies. For example, in
1994, Sharon and Patrick Terry discovered that they
had passed on a rare genetic disease, pseudoxanthoma
elasticum (PXE), to their children. 54 PXE is classified
as an "orphan disease" because it affects only one in
25,000 births, so pharmaceutical companies were
reluctant to invest in research because of the small
revenues anticipated from any results.55
The Terrys realized that individuals who have the
PXE gene are in the best position to control the direc-
tion of research because they possess the most valuable
resource for researchers: their own diseased blood and
tissue.56 Thus, the Terrys located over 2,000 individu-
als with the gene, set up a blood and tissue bank, and
incorporated their network into a non-profit orga-
nization, PXE International. 57 They made the novel
decision to retain ownership of their blood and tissue
through the vehicle of contract law.58 As described in
an article in American Lawyer, "The Terrys decided
to act like many property owners - building a fence
around their property and granting access to it only
in exchange for something of value. The property in
question is the blood of a thousand PXE patients and
their families.'" 59 Before researchers can access the
blood and tissue, they must sign a contract saying that
they will share with PXE International the ownership
and profits on any research from the samples.60
In February 2000, PXE International's efforts paid
off when Charles Boyd, a pathobiologist at the Univer-
sity of Hawaii, isolated the gene responsible for PXE. 61
Boyd listed Sharon Terry as one of the co-inventors
when he submitted the gene's patent application
because he felt that she had served as the catalyst
for the success of the gene search. 62 However, Boyd's
contract with the University of Hawaii stated that he
would relinquish all future intellectual property rights
in the results of his research to the university.63 Ini-
tially, the university was unwilling to give up control
over licensing because it wanted to recoup the costs
of filing the patent and to collect some royalties, but
PXE International offered to cover all those costs and
to share royalties equally if the university would trans-
fer control over licensing, and the university accepted
this offer.
64
C. The Private Body
1. THE BODY AS A PUBLIC RESOURCE
In at least one instance, body parts and the infor-
mation contained in them were treated as a public
resource that could be taken by the state and bestowed
upon a private party. In 1998, the Icelandic Parliament
(the Althingi) enacted the Health Sector Database Act
(HSDA), which authorized the Minister of Health to
grant an exclusive 12-year license to a private company
to create and maintain an electronic database contain-
ing all of the health records of the Icelandic people.
65
These medical records are derived from the country's
national health care system and contain the results of
lab tests, diagnoses, treatments, and the outcome of
such treatments for almost every Icelander living or
dead since 1915,66 as well as tissue samples preserved
in wax blocks of every Icelander who has been autop-
sied since the 1930s. 67 The government granted this
exclusive license to deCODE Genetics, a for-profit
Delaware corporation, which planned to use it to
construct a centralized database linking the medical
records with detailed genealogical records that date
back to the 9th century. The database would also show
genetic information that the company obtained from
over 110,000 Icelanders who voluntarily donated
blood samples.
68
The HSDA denies that these medical records are
"property," asserting that they cannot be subject to
ownership because they are the result of patient treat-
ment.69 The Notes to the law provide, "Due to the nature
of the data and their origin they cannot be subject to
ownership in the usual sense. Institutions, companies
or individuals cannot therefore own the data. They
exist primarily due to the treatment of patients."70 At
the same time, however, the Notes appear to contra-
dict this conclusion by labeling the medical records "a
national resource." Moreover, the HSDA itself appears
to commodify the medical records by treating them as
a form of property that has essentially been seized by
the state and sold to a private company.
71
Indeed, the HSDA grants deCODE the sole right
to commercially exploit the medical records database
in exchange for funding its construction. 72 Article
5 requires that licensees pay for the costs of acquir-
ing these records from health institutions and self-
employed health workers, 73 and Article 10 provides
that "the licensee is authorized during the period of
the license to use the data on the database for pur-
poses of financial profit."74 All that deCODE prom-
ised in return for the right to profit from this infor-
mation was that it would provide Icelanders with free
access to any resulting drugs for the patent period.75
Article 5 of the HSDA also requires the database to
be located exclusively in Iceland 76 and bans the export
of Icelandic blood and DNA for research purposes. 77
This provision was intended to prevent "helicopter sci-
ence" the common research practice of drawing blood
samples from native populations and then flying away
never to be heard from again, in order to ensure that
the people of Iceland would share in the financial prof-
its generated from this research.78 The hope was that
deCODE's presence would provide jobs for Iceland's
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Intangible intellectual property in the body, such as a gene patent or
a cell line, receives much more protection than physical body parts.
The "inventor" or "discoverer" of intellectual property in the body is granted
broad protection that extends across space and time, unlike the individuals who
are seen as supplying "the raw materials" - e.g., the blood, tissue, and
other body parts necessary to conduct such research.
scientists and thereby reverse the brain drain out of
the country, as well as foster the growth of a domes-
tic biotech industry to diversify Iceland's cod-fishing
economy.
79
The HSDA does not require affirmative informed
consent by patients before deCODE can access, com-
pile, and profit from their medical records.8° Instead,
the Act presumes consent, forcing patients to opt
out if they do not wish to have their medical records
included in the database."' By 2002, more than
20,000 people had actively opted out of the medi-
cal records database,2 although critics contend that
even more people would have opted out if the govern-
ment had publicized the dangers inherent in giving a
private company rights over such personal informa-
tion.83 What exactly does "presumed consent" mean?
According to deCODE officials, "[piresumed consent
is a nebulous concept, but.. .we regard it as the con-
sent of society to the use of health care information
according to the norms of society." 4 Yet the presumed
consent standard applies only to medical records,
not to the provision of genetic information .5 Thus,
those who supply genetic information must give their
informed consent in writing before contributing blood
samples S6 About 110,000 Icelanders have volunteered
to provide blood samples for deCODE's genetic data-
base, a number that represents roughly half the total
adult population and includes more than 90 percent
of people over age 65.87
2. THE TURN TO PRIVACY
The rejection of property in the human body often
leads to invocation of a right to privacy. Thus, the con-
stitutionality of the HSDA was challenged in Ragnhil-
dur Gudmundsdottir v. Iceland, which addressed
privacy rather than property rights in genetic infor-
mation."" The plaintiff filed a lawsuit objecting to the
inclusion of her dead father's information in the medi-
cal records database on grounds that it violated her
own right to privacy under Article 71 of the Icelandic
Constitution, which provides, "Everyone shall enjoy
the privacy of his or her own life, home, and family."89
In an opinion published in English on April 1, 2004,
the Icelandic Supreme Court found the HSDA uncon-
stitutional because it failed to protect personal privacy
adequately.9° Her father had not consented to the use
of his own health records, and Ms. Gudmundsdottir
had legal standing to sue because her father's medi-
cal history could reveal information about her own
health, implicating her personal right to privacy.91
Accordingly, the Court granted Ms. Gudmundsdottir
the right to prohibit the transfer of her father's infor-
mation into the medical records database.92
III. Property, Contract, or Privacy?
Although each of these situations appears to embody
a different paradigm for legal regulation of the human
body, all of them actually exemplify the body as prop-
erty. Both Moore and Greenberg declare that the body
is not property, but this conclusion does not follow
from the logic of the opinions. The courts equate
their holding that body parts are not private property
owned by the plaintiffs with the theory that the body is
not property at all. Despite this language, they actually
treat body parts as a kind of property, free for "capture"
by the first person who recognizes their commercial
potential and puts them to productive use. In other
words, Moore and Greenberg apply the property law
of capture to body parts in much the same way that
other courts have applied the law of capture to migra-
tory resources such as oil, water, and wild animals.
93
Hence, they award ownership not to Moore or the
Greenbergs, but rather to the researchers who created
the Mo cell line from Moore's spleen cells and those
who isolated the gene for Canavan's disease using
patients' blood and body parts.
Moreover, Justice Broussard's dissent suggests that
the court probably would have been willing to protect
the property rights of the scientist who used Moore's
spleen to create the Mo cell line by permitting him
a cause of action for conversion if a rival researcher
had stolen the spleen from his lab.94 Justice Brous-
sard proved prescient when his hypothetical came
to life in Washington University v. Catalona, which
granted Washington University ownership of biologi-
cal samples donated by patients over the objections of
a researcher who had relocated to another university
and the patients themselves. Catalona makes it crystal
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clear that physical body parts - not just cell lines and
genetic sequences - do receive property protection
when they are in the possession of a research institu-
tion rather than an ordinary person. By holding that
body parts are free for appropriation by the scientists
who transform them into useful products, all of these
cases actually appear to regard the human body as res
nullius, a form of property that belongs to no one and
is part of the public domain. The analogy to wild ani-
mals, water, and other natural resources is obvious.
Moore's description of the wrong done to him is quite
revealing: "My doctors are claiming that my humanity,
my genetic essence, is their invention and their prop-
erty. They view me as a mine from which to extract
biological material. I was harvested"
95
The government of Iceland also asserts that body
parts and medical records are not property subject to
ownership. 96 Once again, this confuses the concept
that these items are not property with the idea that
they are not private property, but rather belong to the
community. By putting them to public use as a "natu-
ral resource," the government actually characterizes
body parts and information as res communis, a form
of property that belongs to everyone to be used for the
common benefit.
97
Only the PXE contract is truly agnostic on the ques-
tion whether the body is property. Privacy rights could
serve as the basis for the contractual exchange, as
well as property. Yet the PXE contract itself created a
kind of ownership of the human body. Specifically, it
enabled individuals to exert control over the use and
transfer of their body parts - two of the essential attri-
butes of property. Furthermore, by focusing upon the
sharing of profits from the commercial benefits of the
research, rather than issues of consent and confidenti-
ality, the PXE contract also seems to speak in the lan-
guage of property rather than privacy.
A. Problems with the Property Paradigm
All of these cases effectively treat the body as a type of
property. Indeed, propertization of the human body
proceeds inexorably whether or not the law acknowl-
edges this reality.98 Yet profound problems plague the
property paradigm. First, property law seems to sys-
tematically favor certain categories of resources, in the
hands of some kinds of people, much more than oth-
ers. Thus, intangible intellectual property in the body,
such as a gene patent or a cell line, receives much more
protection than physical body parts. The "inventor"
or "discoverer" of intellectual property in the body is
granted broad protection that extends across space and
time, unlike the individuals who are seen as supplying
"the raw materials" - e.g., the blood, tissue, and other
body parts necessary to conduct such research. Bodily
property, on the other hand, is conceived as a tangible
thing that is protected only insofar as it remains in the
possession of its "owner," or that may be deemed un-
ownable and thus not protected at all.
The California Supreme Court, for example,
rejected Moore's conversion claim on grounds that his
spleen was not his property. And the Greenberg court
suggested that ownership of tangible bodily property
(blood and tissue) is so fleeting that it "evaporates" as
soon as the body part leaves the individual's posses-
sion.99 Accordingly, the court also denied the Green-
bergs' claim for conversion. 0 0 Yet in United States v.
Arora,1 1 the court was willing to recognize a cause of
action for conversion when one researcher intention-
ally destroyed a rival scientist's cell line, which was
part of a valuable research project.
10 2
Why are courts willing to allow a claim for conver-
sion in one context but not the other? The contradic-
tory treatment of property in the human body may
flow from the distinction between physical body parts
and intellectual property in the body. Specifically, body
parts are characterized as "raw materials" to be har-
vested, whereas human genes and cell lines are con-
ceptualized as man-made products. Yet even tangible
body parts - not just cell lines and genetic sequences
- receive property protection when they are in the pos-
session of a researcher rather than an ordinary person.
Thus, Washington University v. Catalona awarded
ownership over pure body parts - blood and tissue
samples that had not been transformed into a distinct
product - to the research institution that stored them
rather than the patients who supplied them.
All of these cases afford property rights to the
researchers who isolate the gene or create a cell line
over the persons from whose bodies the purified gene
or cell line is derived. Perhaps this is attributable to
a labor theory of property that values the intellec-
tual work that researchers perform more than the
raw materials" patients provide. But if we consider
Greenberg from a different perspective, the only
really unique and indispensable contribution to the
research on the Canavan gene was provided by the
families who supplied their blood, tissue, and the
bodies of their dead children, as well as their private
medical information.103 The intellectual capital con-
tributed by Dr. Matalon and the financial capital sup-
plied by Miami Children's Hospital were entirely fun-
gible, unlike the very "personal" property0 4 provided
by the families.105 Yet those who contributed fungible
intellectual and financial capital received much more
extensive protection under the law of property than
those who contributed the intimate body parts and
medical information that were absolutely indispens-
able to such research.
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Furthermore, property law favors those who plan
to commodify and commercialize human genes over
those who resist commodification in order to make
genetic resources freely available to all. Thus, the
Greenberg court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument
that the genetic information contained within their
bodies was their property, but suggested that it became
the property of the researchers once it had been com-
modified.10 6 The court conceded that "where informa-
tion is gathered and arranged at some cost and sold as
a commodity on the market, it is properly protected as
property," but reasoned that this argument provided
more support for property rights in the defendants'
research rather than the donations of the plaintiffs'
DNA. 10 7 The court's logic reveals that property implic-
itly privileges some notions of value over others. Utili-
tarian and commercial values appear to predominate
over other values, which are often ignored or not
capable of being fully articulated in the language of
property law. In addition, property law appears to be
skewed towards certain kinds of regimes over others:
private property appears to hold sway over communal
property and the public domain. Thus, the researchers'
commercial plans for the Canavan gene prevailed over
the Greenbergs' altruistic desire to share this informa-
tion with others in order to prevent disease. All of this
suggests that property law has a hidden bias towards
capitalist markets and private property, over sharing
and the public domain.
Ironically, not only did the court reject the Green-
bergs' argument that the Canavan gene patent should
remain part of the public domain because that was
their intent, but instead the court ruled that it was
their bodies and their genes - and not the gene iso-
lated by Dr. Matalon - that were in the public domain,
free for appropriation by the first researcher who
came along and reduced them to private possessionY° s
All of these examples demonstrate the lopsided treat-
ment of property in the human body, which furthers
the transformation of the "raw materials" harvested
from human bodies into the man-made products of
science.
B. Flaws in the Contract Framework
The PXE example appears to avoid many of the prob-
lems present in Moore and Greenberg by resorting to
the rubric of contract law. But before romanticizing the
realm of private bargaining, we should recognize that
flaws exist in the contract framework as well. Contract
law's ability to safeguard individuals depends upon
their position in the genetic market, as well as their
level of knowledge and power. It seems to work well in
the context of "orphan diseases" where a small pool of
people with a gene may unite to wield disproportion-
ate bargaining power. But it may not work as well in
other contexts, such as the following: (1) when indi-
viduals, rather than groups, or single transactions are
involved because the transaction costs of contracting
would generally outweigh the value of the contribu-
tion, thereby discouraging socially valuable research;
(2) when it is difficult for individuals to organize
because they suffer from a widespread disease that
afflicts many; or (3) when individuals lack sufficient
knowledge or power to be able to contract effectively.
Moreover, contract law binds only those who are
parties to the agreement, not the whole world. °9 The
PXE case, for example, never went to court, so it is
unclear whether the contract between the Terrys and
the researcher who discovered the PXE gene would
have been enforced against the University of Hawaii,
especially in the face of the researcher's rival contract
with the university" 0 It is not even clear whether body
parts can form the basis of such a contract if they are
not property for purposes of conversion law. If body
parts are not property, can their exchange provide ade-
quate consideration to support such a contract? And
would a court be willing to enforce such a contract, or
would it be held void as contrary to public policy?
In addition, the PXE families succeeded only inso-
far as their goal coincided with that of the University
of Hawaii - to keep the patented gene private prop-
erty, with the proceeds shared equally between the
patients and the university."' But it is not so clear that
the result would have been the same had PXE Inter-
national's goal been to leave the gene in the public
domain, freely available to all. Accordingly, both prop-
erty and contract appear to push towards protection
of intellectual property in the body as private property,
rather than public or communal property Ironically,
private property in human genes - even when owner-
ship lies in those afflicted by the disease, rather than
the researchers or the hospitals - may result in injus-
tice. In the case of the PXE gene, the patent is owned
by PXE International, which can control use of the
gene and the terms of licensing in the interests of its
"owners." However, PXE International has no incen-
tive to take into account the welfare of other persons
who also possess an interest in the gene, such as the
large number of persons with heart disease, which
may be linked to the PXE gene."
2
It is possible to view the Terrys and other families
with the PXE gene as subjects who took charge of
their own destiny, rather than mere objects of prop-
erty: they flouted the norms of property doctrine to
self-consciously construct a distinct form of property
in the human body by means of contract. Yet at the
same time, they too were trapped within the domi-
nant paradigm, constrained to reproduce and reflect
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its characteristics by contracting to gain ownership of
their own gene. Their contract was successful insofar
as it accomplished the private ownership of human
genes, unlike the Greenbergs, who sought to keep
their genes in the public domain. In so doing, the
Terrys unconsciously reproduced and perpetuated a
property paradigm they appeared to evade, and they
inadvertently gained the power to perpetrate upon
others exactly the same types of injustice they them-
selves sought to avoid. This is because their private
property rights may have negative consequences for
other groups who share an interest in the PXE gene,
so that the inequality between the Greenbergs and
Miami Children's Hospital is mirrored by the imbal-
ance of power between those with PXE and others for
whom the gene also holds importance.
Iceland's unique approach appears to promise a way
out of this dilemma. Rather than treating body parts
as private property or as part of the public domain,
this approach treats body parts as public property to
be used for the good of society. However, it is not clear
that the public will actually benefit from the exclu-
sive license granted to deCODE, especially in relation
to the huge private profits expected to accrue to the
corporation. 113 The fact that the public good is accom-
plished by giving the "natural resource" to a private
corporation provokes concerns regarding the possibil-
ity of government capture or corruption. Moreover,
this transaction has been labeled a form of "bio-piracy,"
the exploitation of Iceland's people for the profit of a
private corporation that has been granted a dangerous
monopoly over a valuable resource that should benefit
everyone." 4 Thus, Iceland's experience seems to illus-
trate the problems of the contract model writ large,
representing both the dangers of privatization and the
risk that poor or small countries will enter into unequal
bargains with wealthy, powerful corporations.
C. The Inadequacy of a Privacy Interest
If property and contract are two sides of the same coin,
with each part of a free market model pushing for com-
modification and commercialization of the human
body, then why not protect the body under the rubric
of privacy? Both property and privacy encompass the
right to possess one's own body, to exercise a certain
degree of control over it, and to exclude others.15 Yet
property protects the autonomy of the "owner" over
that which is owned, whereas privacy safeguards an
inviolable corporeal identity."6 Property envisions a
person who "owns" and is thus distinct from his or her
body, whereas privacy views the person as embodied
and the body as personified." 7 Under property theory,
a person only loosely inhabits his or her body; the self
is independent of its physical embodiment. Privacy,
by contrast, treats the body as integrally connected to
the person, such that invasions of the physical being
endanger its essential personhood18
Accordingly, property theory severs the body from
the person who owns it, whereas privacy theory main-
tains the two as indivisible and inextricably inter-
twined. As property, the body can be detached from
its "owner" and fragmented into discrete components,
allowing it to be manipulated, transformed, alien-
ated on the market, or even seized by the state upon
payment of just compensation. Privacy, on the other
hand, bundles all interests in the body together within
a single person. As a result, bodily privacy is generally
inalienable and unassailable: it can neither be con-
tracted away to private parties nor confiscated by the
government.
In Property, Privacy, and the Human Body,"9 I set
forth three principles to determine whether the body
should be protected as the subject of a privacy inter-
est or the object of property ownership: (1) whether it
is living or dead; (2) whether it is integrated with the
whole person or a separate part; and (3) whether it is
involved in a personal relationship or an object rela-
tionship. 20 Applying these three principles, genetic
material should be protected under the rubric of pri-
vacy when individuals allege that their genes are an
inalienable part of their personal, familial, or cultural
identity.12 1 For example, privacy would encompass
individuals' claims that the extraction of their genetic
materials infringes upon their right to exclude others
from their bodies, or that publication of genetic infor-
mation violates their right to keep their genetic iden-
tities secret in order to protect their individual and
familial privacy and prevent discrimination.
These were exactly the kinds of harms alleged in
Ragnhildur Gudmundsdottir v. Iceland. The plain-
tiff refused to allow her own medical records to be
included in the database.' 22 But she also claimed that
her personal right to privacy would be violated by the
transfer of her dead father's information into the med-
ical records database because he had not personally
consented to such use, and because his medical his-
tory could reveal intimate information about her own
health. 12 3 Unlike property, the government cannot
"take" individuals' privacy rights without their con-
sent, even upon payment of "just compensation."'1
2
Yet the privacy paradigm does not really apply to
cases such as Greenberg and Catalona because the
research subjects in those cases objected neither to
the severing of their blood, tissue, and body parts from
their body, nor to the publication of their genetic infor-
mation. To the contrary, they voluntarily "donated"
their own body parts to research. What they protested
was not the fragmentation of their body and the extrac-
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tion of their genetic information, but rather the acts
of privatization and commercialization.25 Moreover,
the privacy paradigm implicitly requires situations of
intimacy and relationships that may not exist between
researchers and those who participate in biomedical
research. Thus, the Greenberg court also rejected the
plaintiffs' privacy claims for breach of fiduciary duty
and lack of informed consent, based upon the absence
of relationships of trust between researchers and their
subjects.126 Finally, the goal of the Greenbergs was
to make the research freely available to the public
rather than to keep such genetic information private,
which seems to contradict the very premise of privacy
theory.
More fundamentally, property is such a powerful
and pervasive paradigm that propertization of the
human body often takes place whether or not it is
acknowledged explicitly. Privacy cannot counter the
right of property: it offers inadequate protection to
those who provide the "raw materials" of biomedical
research if everyone else is permitted to commodify
and commercialize the human body. Washington
University v. Catalona reveals that the privacy right
to informed consent includes only the right to give
or withhold body parts for medical research, but it
does not encompass the right to control or direct the
research in any way. Moreover, it does not even include
the right to be informed of the potential profits to be
reaped from such research or of researchers' plans for
privatization. In the face of substantial property rights
on the part of researchers and research institutions,
such meager privacy interests leave those who supply
body parts too vulnerable to exploitation.
IV. Conclusion
On the one hand, property law seems to be system-
atically biased in favor of some categories of property
in the human body and some kinds of ownership over
others. Specifically, property privileges those who plan
to commodify and commercialize human genes over
those who wish to make genetic resources freely avail-
able to all. On the other hand, contract and privacy
rights cannot compete with the powerful property
paradigm, which alone affords a complete bundle of
rights that are enforceable against the whole world.
In the face of strong property rights on the part of
researchers and research institutions, the theoretical
freedom to contract and the meager interest in pri-
vacy leave those who supply body parts vulnerable to
exploitation.
So what is to be done to protect those who wish to
donate their body parts to biomedical research while
retaining a measure of control over the products of
such research? Perhaps we should transform the mod-
ern law of property in the human body by resurrecting
an older strand of property theory that has been long
dormant - the concept of property as stewardship.
Indeed, John Locke's famous statement that "every
Man has a Property in his own Person" embodies
this vision of property in the body because he viewed
individuals as stewards over their bodies, possessing
themselves in trust rather than as outright owners.'
27
Precisely such an approach is advocated by David Win-
ickoff, who innovatively applies charitable trust law in
an attempt to create a partnership between biomedi-
cal researchers and research subjects in the context
of genomic biobanks.12s Winickoff's charitable trust
model may provide a way out of the puzzling dilem-
mas posed by existing property, contract, and privacy
rights in human genes and spleens.
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